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I. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY AS APPLIED IN CLAIMS OF 
NEGLIGENCE IN ROAD SIGNING. MARKING OR CONSTRUCTION.
Beginning with the 1988 Supreme Court decision in Peavler v. Board o f Commissioners o f Monroe 
County, 528 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1988), Indiana courts have retreated from an expansive view toward 
the scope o f statutory immunity, as afforded by the Indiana Tort Claims Act, at least in the context 
o f road claims involving allegations of negligence in signing, marking, maintenance or construction. 
The broad interpretation o f statutory immunity has begun to erode, as the courts have narrowed or 
placed restrictions upon immunity for "enforcing a law,"1 for ice and snow on roadways or sidewalks,* 2 
for the acts or omissions o f non-governmental employees,3 or for initiation o f judicial or 
administrative proceedings 4: each has been construed by the Supreme Court or Court o f Appeals 
in a way that further restricts the availability of immunity as a defense to various claims in tort.
Perhaps no class of claims has been adversely affected, from the defendant's standpoint, as has been 
negligence claims against governmental entities, predicated upon alleged defects in signing, marking 
or road construction. Discretionary function immunity, once readily available as a shield against 
claims predicated upon the failure to sign or mark roadways, became severely restricted in its 
application with issuance o f the Peavler decision. Yet discretionary function immunity still has 
application, particularly in claims which assert negligence on the basis o f the entity's failure to act 
legislatively, or to undertake a public improvement, even in the absence o f an evidentiary record 
sufficient to fulfill the onerous Peavler test.
For most attorneys involved in the defense of tort claims against governmental entities, discretionary 
function immunity traditionally has been applied in claims asserting negligence in road design or
Q uakenbush v. Lackey. 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993) overruled prior holdings which afforded "law enforcement 
immunity" for police-related activities. Seymour National Bank v. State. 422 N.E.2d 1223, modified on reh'g, 428 
N.E.2d 203 (Ind. 1981); Tittle v. Mahan. 582 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. 1991).
2
There is still immunity for natural accumulations of ice or snow on roadways and sidewalks, but not if the entity had 
"time and opportunity" to remove the ice or snow. Van Bree v. Harrison County. 584 N.E.2d 1114 (Ind.App. 1992).
3Hinshaw v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, 611 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1993) essentially removes any realistic 
application of Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(9).
4Radcliif v. County of Harrison. 618 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind.App. 1993).
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maintenance, sidewalk maintenance, or in claims asserting the failure to undertake a particular public 
service or improvement. The focus o f this section is on application o f discretionary function 
immunity in tort claims involving roads and sidewalks.
Immunity presumes negligence, Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 46, and therefore presumes the entity owed 
a duty of reasonable care, breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate cause o f plaintiffs 
injury. The purpose behind immunity is to afford non-liability status to the governmental entity, 
despite its potential negligence, for public policy reasons as embodied in the Tort Claims Act itself. 
If  an immunity applies to the conduct complained of, the entity is simply not liable. State v. Taylor. 
419 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ind.App. 1981). Attorneys representing plaintiffs too often misconstrue 
immunity by arguing against its application on the basis that the entity owed a duty in tort. In the 
context of roads, governmental entities owe a duty o f reasonable care in the design, construction and 
maintenance o f their roadways. Indiana State Highway Commission v. Clark. 371 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 
(Ind.App. 1978), but consideration o f their entitlement to statutory immunity has little to do with 
duties in tort, nor whether it is fair to allow entities to escape liability where an immunity has 
application.
The Tort Claims Act provides governmental entities are immune from liability for discretionary 
functions of government:
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not 
liable if a loss results from:
* * *
6) the performance of a discretionary function 
Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(6).
Peavler changed the law, particularly in the context of road claims, by requiring governmental entities 
show policy-oriented decision making in order to enjoy immunity. Most road claims involve 
allegations concerning the entity’s failure to install a warning sign, a road marking, a regulatory sign, 
or involve allegations of negligence in the manner by which a particular road was constructed, signed 
or marked. Discretionary function immunity clearly has no application to maintenance claims, e.g., 
downed signs, see Board of Commissioners of Delaware County v. Briggs. 337 N.E.2d 852 (Ind.App. 
1975), but its application may be broader than the Peavler test suggests. To understand the broader 
sweep of discretionary function immunity, as espoused here, it is important to first review the history 
o f the courts' construction of the immunity, as derivative from common law.
A) History o f Governmental Immunity.
Sovereign immunity was abrogated by the Supreme Court in 1972. Campbell v. State. 259 Ind. 55, 
284 N.E.2d 733 (1972). With sovereign immunity went the common law distinction based on 
governmental functions as opposed to proprietary functions. Technically speaking, sovereign
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immunity applied only to the state, but counties, cities and towns also enjoyed immunity from many 
claims in tort until the late 1960s, when the Court o f Appeals abolished immunity for counties, cities 
or towns as based upon the govemmental/proprietary distinction.
Sovereign immunity, or simply governmental immunity, was adopted from English common law, but 
began to erode as early as the late 19th Century. City of Goshen v. Mvers. 119 Ind. 196, 21 N.E. 657 
(1889) (city subject to liability for poorly maintained bridge). The govemmental/proprietary 
distinction was fashioned by the courts as a means o f distinguishing traditional governmental 
functions from those functions or acts which were analogous to acts exercised by private parties. The 
entity was considered immune when exercising governmental functions, but not when performing 
proprietary functions. Campbell v. State. 284 N.E.2d at 735; City o f Kokomo v. Lov. 185 Ind. 18, 
112 N.E. 994 (1916). Duties administered for the public benefit, such as for public health, schools, 
or protection o f property against fire, were considered governmental undertakings for which there 
was immunity. Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 42.
The govemmental/proprietary test, however, was never clearly enunciated by the Indiana courts, 
which were unable to establish definitive criteria for the test's application, resulting in opinions such 
as Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis. 141 Ind. App. 662, 666, 231 N.E.2d 169, 172 (1967), transfer 
denied ("The govemmental/proprietary rule, however, often produces legalistic distinctions that are 
only remotely related to the fundamental consideration of municipal tort liability"). Brinkman was 
followed by Klepinger v. Board o f Commissioners. 143 Ind.App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160 (1968), 
transfer denied, where the Court o f Appeals made it clear that the govemmental/proprietary 
distinction was to be abrogated in claims where immunity was asserted on behalf o f a city or county.
The Supreme Court conceded, in 1969, that municipal corporations and counties were exempt from 
common law immunity, Perkins v. State. 252 Ind.549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969), though the state 
continued to enjoy immunity for governmental functions until the Campbell decision in 1972.
The Campbell decision, while abrogating sovereign (or "governmental") immunity, noted that certain 
common law immunities, such as immunity for legislative decisions, must remain. Quoting Prosser, 
the court in Campbell suggested that "it was more or less obvious that some vestige o f governmental 
immunity must be retained . . . [i]n several o f the decisions abrogating the immunities, there was 
language used which reserved the possibility that there might still be immunity for 'legislative' or 
judicial' functions, or as to acts or omissions o f government employees which were 'discretionary."' 
Campbell. 284 N.E.2d at 737.
The Campbell court also suggested that "the proper forum for such argument is in the legislature," 
284 N.E. 2d at 737, and the legislature did in fact act by enacting the Tort Claims Act in 1974.5
Immunity for discretionary functions o f government, as set forth in Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(6), is 
therefore subject to interpretation with this historical background in mind.
5 1974 Ind. Acts, P.L. 142, sec. 1.
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B) Enactment o f the Tort Claims Act and Adoption o f the Discretionarv/Ministerial Test.
Having abandoned the governmental/proprietary test as a basis for evaluating claims o f common law 
sovereign (governmental) immunity, the courts then had to fashion a test for determining which 
functions o f government are discretionary and therefore subject to immunity under 34-4-16.5-3(6). 
Were discretionary functions again to be viewed as governmental functions, as per the old test, or 
evaluated by some new standard? The new test adopted by the courts was the 
discretionary/ministerial test. This test was described in the 1919 decision in Adams v. Schneider. 
71 Ind.App. 249, 255-56, 124 N.E. 718, 720 (1919), and has generally been construed as follows: 
a discretionary function requires judgment and choice as to what is proper and just under the 
circumstances, whereas a ministerial act is simply performed in a prescribed manner, without the 
exercise of judgment upon the propriety o f the act. See generally, Rodman v. City o f Wabash. 497 
N.E.2d 234 (Ind.App. 1986); Coehill v. Badger. 418 N.E.2d 1201, 1211, n.9; Peavler. 528 N.E.2d 
at 43.
Under the discretionary/ministerial test, governmental functions involving choice, judgment or 
decision making were considered discretionary and subject to immunity, whereas ministerial acts, not 
requiring judgment, subjected entities to potential tort liability.
Applied in the context o f road claims, discretionary function immunity, as construed under the 
discretionary/ministerial test, served as a shield against a variety of claims alleging negligence in 
failing to install signs or markings on roadways:
1) City of Tell City v. Noble. 489 N.E.2d 958 (Ind.App. 1986) (city's failure to install stop sign 
at intersection a discretionary act);
2) City o f Indianapolis v. Constant. 498 N.E.2d 1308 (Ind.App. 1986) (city's decision not to 
install left turn arrow signal for southbound traffic while installing left turn arrow signal for 
northbound traffic a discretionary act);
3) Board o f Commissioners o f Steuben County v. Hout, 497 N.E.2d 597 (Ind.App. 1986) 
(failure to place warning signs at approach to a T-intersection a discretionary function);
4) DuBois County Bank v. City o f Vincennes. 517 N.E.2d 805 (Ind.App. 1988) (city's failure 
to install warning signs at or near juncture o f street and parking lot exit a discretionary act; 
See also dicta at page 808: decision to place curb markings at a particular location a 
discretionary act).
But see Court o f Appeals' decision in Peavler v. Board o f  Commissioners o f Monroe County. 492 
N .E .2d 1086 (Ind.App. 1987) (failure to install a warning sign at a dangerous location may be a 
ministerial act).
These decisions, overruled or modified in large part by the Supreme Court decision in Peavler. rest 
on the general principle that a governmental entity had no absolute duty to provide signs, and that 
the exercise of such was discretionary. City o f Tell City v. Noble. 489 N.E.2d at 963. The holdings 
rested on a distinction between the decision to install a sign at a particular location (a discretionary 
function) and the obligation to maintain the sign once in place. Board o f Commissioners of Steuben 
County v. Hout. 497 N.E.2d at 599. The distinction was best described in Tell City :
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After analyzing the above material, we find that the alleged negligent act in the instant case was Tell 
City's failure to erect traffic control devices at the intersection in question. We are not dealing with 
an assertion of faulty maintenance, or an assertion that the physical aspect o f the signs did not meet 
the manual's specifications. Nor are we dealing with an assertion that the alleged negligent act was 
committed by a workman, by a maintenance crew foreman, or even by the director o f the street 
department. We are dealing with an act o f the governing body itself. Under Ind. Code 9-4, as 
discussed above, the decision to erect traffic control devices is to be made bv ordinance o f the city 
council and therefore the decision is legislative as well as penal in nature. Neither the statutes nor the 
manual create any mandatory duty in that regard, rather the how, what and where o f traffic control 
device placement is addressed to the discretion o f the city council. Such an act bv a city council is 
both legislative and discretionary. Non-action is likewise is legislative and discretionary.
Therefore, under the plain meaning o f Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(6) and (7), Tell City is immune from 
liability for its decision not to erect a traffic control device at the intersection in question. I f  Ind. 
Code 34-4-16.5-3(6) and (7) are not applicable here, we are at a loss as to where they would be 
applicable. A contrary decision would emasculate the tort claim immunity statute.
City of Tell City. 489 N.E.2d at 964 (emphasis added).
The court in Tell City went on to note that "we perceive that it was not the intent o f the legislature 
to permit a lay jury to second guess the acts of local authorities." City o f Tell City, 489 N.E.2d at 
964.
Tell City essentially held that all signing decisions were subject to immunity, a holding predicated on 
the legislature's use o f permissive language in Chapter 9-4 (now 9-21) in granting traffic control 
powers to local government: "Should the legislature have intended to make placing stop signs 
mandatory, it would have used the word 'shall'. . . [o]f course it would have been impracticable for 
the legislature to do so, since the signing of streets and highways clearly requires judgment and 
discretion." City o f Tell City. 489 N.E.2d at 961-62.
The rationale in Tell City was also described in City o f Indianapolis v. Constant:
Tell City also set forth the statutory scheme governing the placement, legal effect, and enforcement 
o f traffic control devices as provided by Ind. Code 9-4, the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on 
Highways. Although the act has state-wide application, we noted that local authorities have the 
power, with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction, and within the reasonable 
exercise o f police power, to regulate traffic by means o f control signals. Tell City, supra, at 960. 
Indeed, no signal can ever be installed except bv ordinance o f a governmental entity.
City of Indianapolis v. Constant. 498 N.E.2d at 1310 (emphasis added).
This body of law, favorable to governmental defendants, was undermined by Peavler's abandonment 
of the discretionary/ministerial test, insofar as it was no longer law, after Peavler. that all signing or 
marking decisions were automatically subject to discretionary function immunity. However, there 
are important aspects o f  this pre-Peavler line of cases which still provide bases for discretionary 
function immunity, even post-Peavler. Decisions such as Tell City and Constant may, and should still 
be good law when dealing with claims based upon a failure to install regulatory signs, or where
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comprehensive road sign ordinances exist. Further, warning signs must be viewed differently than 
regulatory signs or devices, at least for purposes of discretionary function immunity, and 
comprehensive road sign ordinances may, independently, provide a basis for discretionary function 
immunity.
C) Peavler and Adoption o f the Planning/Operational Test.
In 1988, the Supreme Court accepted transfer in Peavler v. Board of Commissioners o f Monroe 
County and in Board o f Commissioners o f Steuben County v. Hout. in order to resolve the issue o f 
whether governmental entities were immune from liability for the exercise of discretionary functions, 
where the claims in negligence rest upon the entity's failure to install signs in the first instance. The 
court held that governmental entities were not immune absent a showing of policy-oriented decision 
making; that immunity was available only for planning or policy-making functions, not errors in 
judgment. In the words o f the court, "the discretionary function exception insulates only those 
significant policy and political decisions which cannot be assessed by customary tort standards." 
Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 45.
In other words, the failure to sign or mark a roadway will not invoke discretionary function immunity 
absent the entity showing that it specifically decided not to sign, where that decision involved policy 
considerations: "the governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden o f proving 
that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by consciously balancing risks and 
benefits." Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 46.
In an effort to fashion a test for determining "whether the function is the type intended to benefit from 
immunity," the court described various factors which "point toward immunity," 528 N.E.2d at 46:
1) The nature o f the conduct --
a) Whether the conduct has a regulatory objective;
b) Whether the conduct involved the balancing o f factors without reliance on a readily 
ascertainable rule or standard;
c) Whether the conduct requires judgment based on policy decisions;
d) Whether the decision involved adopting general principles or only applying them;
e) Whether the conduct involved establishment of plans, specifications and schedules; 
and
f) Whether the decision involved assessing priorities, weighing o f budgetary 
considerations or allocation of resources.
2) The effect o f governmental operations --
a) Whether the decision affects the feasibility or practicability o f a government program; 
and
b) Whether liability will affect the effective administration of the function in question.
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3) The capacity of the courts to evaluate the propriety o f the government's action -- a) Whether
tort standards offer an insufficient evaluation o f the plaintiffs claim.
These various factors were adopted by the court as a means of evaluating discretionary function 
immunity under a new test adopted in Peavler. the planning/operational test, drawn from Federal Tort 
Claims Act litigation. Under the planning operational test, courts are to distinguish between decisions 
involving the formulation o f policy, which are entitled to immunity, from decisions regarding only the 
execution or implementation o f that policy, which are not entitled to immunity. Greathouse v. 
Armstrong. 616 N.E.2d 364, 366-67 (Ind. 1993).
The court did not suggest how many o f the factors require proof in order to warrant application of 
discretionary function immunity, but the essential conclusion is that a challenged decision is subject 
to  immunity if  the decision resulted from a policy-oriented decision making process. If  entities 
engage in that process, the courts may not judge the wisdom of their decisions, as that judgment is 
left to the political process.
This standard posed obviously difficult requirements for some entities to meet, particularly rural 
counties and smaller cities and towns. To begin with, many road claims do not involve a "challenged 
decision" at all, as the road in question may have never been signed at the location in question. 
Further, even if signed, the "decision" to install a certain sign at a certain location may have been 
made years ago, by certain unknown personnel, for reasons not entirely clear. Few signing decisions, 
especially on rural county roads, arose from conscious balancing of risks and benefits.
Burdened now with offering proof to satisfy the new factors under the planning/operational test, 
discretionary function immunity, at least in road claims based on negligence in signing or marking, 
retained only a shadow of its former scope. The court, under the new test, determined that neither 
M onroe County or Steuben County presented evidence showing their respective failure to install 
warning signs resulted from a policy-oriented decision making process:
The county did not present evidence that the T-intersection had been considered by the Board o f 
Commissioners or that it was part of a policy process in which elected officials played a key role. It 
did not introduce minutes o f board meetings where the need for a warning sign was rejected or 
present testimony of commissioners regarding the decision making process involved. It did not 
introduce a comprehensive ordinance, studies or surveys o f the area in question which showed that 
this area had been evaluated and a warning sign had been deemed unnecessary.
The county presented no evidence from which we can evaluate the nature of the board's conduct in 
failing to erect a warning sign, the potential effect o f liability on county operations, or the capacity 
o f the court to judge the county's action. We cannot determine from this record whether the failure 
to erect a warning sign arose from a judgment based on policy considerations.
Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 48.
The court remanded the two suits with the admonition that "if the county in either case can present
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evidence that the commissioners engaged in a policy-oriented decision making process and 
determined, for whatever reason, that a warning sign should not be posted, the courts will not 
second-guess their judgment." 528 N.E.2d at 48.
Justice Pivamik, writing in dissent, recognized the magnitude o f the new burden o f establishing 
policy-oriented decision making in signing claims:
The majority seems to infer that with respect to every point in every road and street in this state, 
whether it is a curve, a hill, an intersection, or any other type o f terrain, the governing body must be 
able to show that it had an affirmative hearing and made express and affirmative findings that a sign 
was not necessary at that particular point. Obviously, this is a burden no governing body can hope 
to carry and certainly is not what the legislature intended.
Peavler, 528 N .E .2d  a t  51.
In the words of Justice Pivamik, "the effect of the holding o f the majority is to virtually wipe out all 
governmental immunity . . . .  " 528 N.E.2d at 51.
Peavler clearly created new burdens for defense counsel in establishing an entitlement to discretionary 
function immunity, which burdens often cannot be met, at least in the context o f warning signs. 
Regulatory signs, on the other hand, are installed by ordinance and deserve different consideration, 
as suggested even by the Peavler majority under note 2. Before discussing the impact o f note 2, and 
the post-Peavler decisions, it is useful to review the statutory scheme and provisions o f the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, in order to appreciate the different considerations which come 
into play in evaluating warning sign claims from those alleging a failure to post regulatory signs or 
markings which regulate traffic.
D) The Statutory Scheme Under Ind. Code 9-21 and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices: Note 2 o f Peavler.
Chapter 9-21 o f the Indiana Code contains a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the powers 
and authority of local units of government to regulate traffic on roadways, Ind. Code 9-21-1 through
4. Regulation of traffic is accomplished by use of regulatory signs or signals, such as stop signs, yield 
signs, traffic lights, markings on pavement prohibiting passing, etc. Regulation o f speed is 
accomplished by speed limit signs, which are to be distinguished from advisory speed plates posted 
beneath advance curve warning signs or other warning signs, which plates warn the driver of a 
recommended speed through the curve or road condition which the driver is approaching.
The legislature has granted local units of government the authority to regulate traffic, by ordinance, 
through use o f regulatory signs and devices. Ind. Code 9-21-l-3(b). Posting regulatory signs such 
as stop, yield, or speed limit signs requires the entity first enact an ordinance, authorizing the 
installation. Many entities have enacted comprehensive road sign ordinances which delineate four­
way stop intersections, two-way stop intersections, yield sign installations, speed limits, etc. These 
comprehensive ordinances require amendment each time the entity elects to change a regulatory 
device, or lowers a speed limit.
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The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices has been adopted by statute, and governmental 
entities must follow the manual and its specifications when installing signs or markings. Ind. Code 
9-21-4-1, 3. I f  roads are signed, adherence to the manual is required, Smith v. Cook. 361 N.E.2d 
197, 200 (Ind.App. 1977), and the failure to adhere raises a maintenance issue not subject to 
immunity.6 The manual requires signs be visible, so claims involving signs shrouded by trees or 
growth involve potential violations o f the manual and are not generally subject to immunity 
considerations. See Miller v. Indiana State Highway Department. 507N.E.2d 1009, (Ind.App. 1987).
Regulatory signs are identified in Part II-B o f the manual, and are generally regarded as signs which 
inform highway users o f traffic laws or regulations, and which indicate the applicability o f legal 
requirements which would not otherwise be apparent to the driver. Manual. Section No. 2B-1. 
Section 2B-1 provides regulatory signs require ordinance by local authorities, though it exempts one­
way streets, dual-lane highways, ramp and restricted turn lane signs from the requirement o f a 
supporting resolution or ordinance.
Section 2B provides "warrants" for installation of stop and yield signs, Sections 2B-5 and 8; for multi­
way stops, Section 2B-6; and specific procedures for establishing or altering speed limits, Section 2B- 
10.12. Speed limits are generally established at the five mile-per-hour increment at or above the 85th 
percentile o f the prevailing speed on the roadway, as established by speed sample and traffic count. 
Section 2B-10.12(h).
Warning signs, as distinguished from regulatory signs, are installed as an aid in alerting motorists to 
approaching road conditions, and generally serve the driver who is unacquainted with the road. 
Warning signs are described under Part IIC of the manual. Typical conditions or locations for 
consideration of warning signs are in advance of changes in horizontal alignment (curves and turns), 
severe changes in grade, dips, bumps, substantial changes in pavement width, such as narrow bridges, 
changes in roadway surface conditions, or at locations where advisory speeds are justified. Excerpts 
from the manual are contained in the appendix.
The failure to install warning signs, and the willingness o f engineering experts retained by plaintiffs 
to offer opinions concerning the desirability of such signs, has resulted in a substantial body of 
litigation predicated on the notion that warning signs are required in advance o f numerous road 
conditions in order to render the road reasonably safe.
Ind. Code 9-21 does not address warning signs, nor does the Uniform Manual provide that an 
ordinance or resolution is required for their installation. Regulatory signs control the flow o f traffic; 
their violation constitutes a civil offense, penal in nature, Tell City, 489 N.E.2d at 964, a violation not 
only o f the requirements imposed upon motorists under Ind. Code 9-21-8-1 et seq, but a violation 
o f the ordinance itself.
6 Violation of the manual is not, however, a basis for per se negligence; the manual does not create a statutory duty. 
Miller v. Ind. State Highway Dept.. 507 N.E.2d 1009,1012 (Ind.App. 1987).
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A warning sign, on the other hand, imposes no obligation on the part o f the driver; it merely warns 
him of a condition, and it is up to the driver as to whether he intends to alter his driving behavior in 
response to the warning. Again, the purpose of a warning sign is to alert drivers o f conditions which 
may be unsafe, at least while traveling at prevailing speed, or conditions which may pose a problem 
for the unacquainted.
Governmental entities are free to install warning signs wherever they choose, without limitation in 
number, though the manual discourages too frequent use o f  signs. Entities are even authorized to 
fashion their own warning signs, not described in the manual itself. The manual only requires that 
warning signs be o f the standard shape and color, and be placed in accordance with the requirements 
of the manual as to distance from the condition, and as to appropriate choice o f sign in relation to the 
condition to be warned of.
Viewed in the context o f  a typical rural county, for example, it can be said that the county highway 
superintendent is free to install a warning sign in advance o f a curve on a road, on his own volition, 
pursuant to his statutory authority. Ind. Code 8-17-3-2. No action on the part of the Board of 
Commissioners is required, no ordinance or resolution, no approval by legislative decision making.
But the same county superintendent has no authority to unilaterally install a stop at an intersection 
which was previously unmarked, or which was previously a two-way stop or two-way yield 
intersection. That decision requires an ordinance enacted by the Board o f Commissioners,7 which 
ordinance directs the superintendent to install the required regulatory signs.
What are the implications o f the distinctions between warning and regulatory signs and devices in the 
context o f  discretionary function immunity? The implications, in the view o f this writer, are 1) 
comprehensive road sign ordinances pertaining to regulatory signs are sufficient to invoke 
discretionary function immunity; 2) the failure to install regulatory signs or devices, by ordinance, is 
still a function subject to immunity; 3) the failure to install a warning sign may still be subject to 
immunity, if addressed at a legislative level.
Footnote 2 o f the Peavler decision illustrates how comprehensive road sign ordinances, which 
typically pertain only to installation o f regulatory signs and devices, still serve as a basis for 
discretionary function immunity. Peavler overruled Hout and other prior decisions which held that 
signing decisions were discretionary as a matter o f law, but distinguished those cases from City of 
Tell City v. Noble. 489 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. App. 1986), at note 2 of the decision, on the basis that Tell 
City did have a comprehensive ordinance which identified how intersections were to be marked with 
regulatory signs:
2. These cases are therefore distinguished from City o f Tell City v. Noble (1986), Ind. App., 489 
N.E.2d 958, where there was evidence that a comprehensive ordinance existed which 
delineated intersections which should be marked. The intersection in question was not
7 The board of commissioners is the county executive, Ind. Code 36-1-2-5,36-2-2-2, but is also the legislative body 
in most counties. Ind. Code 36-1-2-9; 36-2-3.5-1, etseq. The legislative body in more populous counties is the county 
council.
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included in the ordinance. From this, we conclude that the city considered the intersection 
in question in adopting the comprehensive ordinance and determined that the intersection 
should not be marked. The wisdom o f this decision cannot be reviewed by the courts.
Note 2 may be dictum, but the language of the footnote and the court's unwillingness to overrule Tell 
City suggests that policy-oriented decision making is established, as a matter of law, where 1) the 
entity had a comprehensive road sign ordinance delineating how intersections or other locations were 
to be signed by use o f regulatory signs or devices and 2) where the location in question is specifically 
addressed in the ordinance itself.
Tell City involved an unmarked city intersection. The plaintiff alleged the city was negligent in failing 
to install a stop sign at the intersection, or at least some regulatory control. Yet the city enjoyed 
immunity, even if Tell City is examined again in light o f Peavler. because it had an ordinance 
delineating intersections which should be marked, which ordinance deleted the intersection in 
question. Tell City. 489 N.E.2d at 959.
Critics o f Tell City and o f the too expansive reading o f note 2 argue that it is not the mere existence 
of an ordinance which confers discretionary function immunity, but proof o f the process by which the 
entity concluded that the location in question should not be marked. The process may be reflected 
in the language o f the ordinance itself, or may be proven up by evidence of studies, surveys, board 
minutes, etc., as discussed in Peavler.
From the entity's perspective, however, all legislative decision making is, by its nature, policy-oriented 
decision making. Ordinances are clearly acts o f the policy-making authority o f the entity, but are they 
in fact policy-oriented decision making, i.e., "planning," or mere operational functions which take 
place under the guise o f actual legislation? The defendant's response should be that a legislative 
function is a discretionary function. The legislature has determined that regulatory signs require 
ordinance, and therefore require legislation, i.e., policymaker-level action. The county superintendent 
of highways or street commissioner cannot install regulatory signs on his own authority. Where the 
legislature vests authority according to the discretion o f the legislative bodies o f local units of 
government, a discretionary function o f government exists. This is the fundamental argument in Tell 
City, as distinguished from other signing scenarios as presented to the court in Peavler.
The impact o f Tell City has been watered down by subsequent decisions, discussed infra, yet the 
fundamental argument remains that legislative functions are discretionary functions; that the Peavler 
factors provide nothing more than a means of determining, on an evidentiary level, whether discretion 
was in fact utilized when confronted with scenarios which do not involve legislative decision making. 
In other words, if the challenged act or omission is not one which would necessarily require 
enactment of a law, the Peavler factors provide a means for assessing whether in fact the entity acted 
as though it were involved in formulation o f law or policy.
The Peavler factors must be met in order to show an entity enjoys discretionary function immunity 
for not installing an advance curve warning sign, for example, but can be disregarded if the condition 
complained o f is the absence o f a stop sign, per Tell City, where the missing regulatory sign was 
previously addressed by comprehensive ordinance, even if the ordinance simply deleted the
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intersection from any signing whatsoever. The ordinance is, in itself, evidence o f policy-oriented 
decision making.
Peavler hints that legislative functions are discretionary functions, though no doubt the court had 
something more weighty in mind than the mere enactment of an ordinance authorizing installation of 
a stop sign. The court cited the Restatement o f Torts:
This interpretation of the discretionary function exception also comports with the Restatement 
(Second) o f Torts:
Even when a state is subject to tort liability, it and its governmental agencies are immune to liability 
for acts and omissions constituting
a) the exercise o f a judicial or legislative function, or
b) the exercise of an administrative function involving the determination o f fundamental 
government policy.
Restatement, supra. Section 895B(3).
Peavler concedes that under the planning/operational test, the type o f discretion which may be 
immunized from tort liability is that "attributable to the essence o f governing," 528 N.E.2d at 45, 
which legislative decision making clearly is, yet the court defines the inquiry as "not whether judgment 
was exercised, but whether the nature of the judgment called for policy considerations." 528 N.E.2d 
at 45. Plaintiffs may argue that merely deciding not to install a stop sign, even if done per 
comprehensive ordinance, does not confer immunity because such a decision does not involve the 
kind o f policy considerations Peavler contemplates.
Yet Peavler. fundamentally, is really a decision about separation of powers; the separation o f powers 
doctrine forecloses the courts from reviewing political, social and economic actions within the 
province o f  coordinate branches o f government. Discretionary function immunity exists so that 
coordinate branches o f government are not subject to scrutiny by judges or juries as to the wisdom 
o f their performance. 528 N.E.2d at 44.
Discretionary function immunity under the Tort Claims Act is therefore inextricably tied in with the 
notion o f separation o f powers, and the purposes behind governmental immunity. At common law, 
governmental entities owed no duty to legislate, nor perform legislative functions, and could not be 
liable for negligence in the performance or failure to perform legislative duties or powers. Weis v. 
City o f Madison. 85 Ind. 241 (1881); Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette. 26 Ind. 17 (1866); Vaughtman 
v. Town o f Waterloo. 14 Ind.App. 649, 43 N.E. 476 (1896). Nor could a governmental entity be 
subject to liability for failing to enact an ordinance. Millett v. City o f Princeton. 167 Ind. 582, 79 
N.E. 909 (1907); Wheeler v. City of Plymouth. 116 Ind. 158, 18 N.E. 532 (1888); See generally, 57 
Am.Jur.2d, Section 211, Municipal Tort Liability.
These common law rules are embodied more explicitly in subsection 7 o f the immunities section of
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the Tort Claims Act (immunity for "failure to adopt a law"), but apply as well in order to add 
definition to the parameters o f discretionary function immunity, in the context o f immunity for 
legislative acts. From the perspective o f governmental entities, the Tell City court was right when 
it announced that legislative acts are discretionary acts, as a matter o f law. Tell City. 489 N.E.2d at 
964.
The objective of defense counsel, when confronted with signing claims involving regulatory functions, 
is to convince the court that Tell City and Peavler complement one another, each addressing specific 
fact situations which require different considerations. That objective, however, is made all the more 
difficult when confronted with decisions such as Board of Commissioners of Adams County v. Price. 
587 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind.App. 1992), a post-Peavler decision.
E) Post-Peavler Decisions
Board o f Commissioners o f Adams County v. Price. 587 N.E.2d 1326 (Ind.App. 1992) is troubling 
to defense counsel not so much for its holding, but for its use o f language in relegating Tell City to 
the scrap heap of overruled pre-Peavler decisions addressing discretionary function immunity.
Price involved an unmarked rural intersection, where a collision took place. Plaintiff alleged 
negligence on the part of the county in failing to install stop signs. Adams County apparently did not 
have a comprehensive road sign ordinance, as in Tell City. and attempted to defeat the claim by 
proving up the Peavler factors, a fruitless exercise for most counties.
The county attempted to prove policy-oriented decision making by offering evidence that the Board 
of Commissioners relied on a system of citizen complaints. The Court of Appeals, correctly, held that 
mere "reactive" conduct does not amount to policy-oriented decision making; that the Board of 
Commissioners had not arrived at a policy-oriented decision to not sign the particular intersection, 
and noted that there was no evidence before the court such an ordinance, board minutes, studies, etc. 
which showed the board had, in fact, elected not to sign the particular intersection.
The problem with Price is that Adams County argued on appeal that its case was analogous to Tell 
City. because both involved unsigned intersections; that Tell City should therefore stand as authority 
barring the claim. The Court o f Appeals, in response, noted that Tell City was "superseded" by 
Peavler. Price. 587 N.E.2d at 1329, and by the new Peavler test.
Judge Barteau's statement in Price is correct insofar as the absence of signage may no longer 
automatically be subject to discretionary function immunity; Peavler did in fact "supersede" Tell City 
(and other decisions) to that extent. But Peavler did not overrule Tell City with regard to recognition 
of immunity in the face o f a comprehensive road sign ordinance, a matter not even at issue in Price. 
and to the extent Price holds that Tell City is overruled in all respects, the decision is wrong; Tell City 
controls if the immunity issue turns on whether a comprehensive road sign ordinance exists, and if 
that ordinance applies to the location or intersection in question. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Peavler faulted Steuben County, in Hout. because "it did not introduce a comprehensive ordinance 
. . . . "  Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 48.
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Even in the context o f warning signs, an ordinance may be sufficient to immunize the entity. In 
Mullen v. City o f Mishawaka. 531 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.App. 1988), the plaintiffs vehicle left the roadway 
and the plaintiff sustained injury. She alleged the city was negligent in failing to install some type of 
warning sign at the particular location. The city offered the testimony o f the city engineer, who 
testified that he established a comprehensive plan for installation o f warning signs at certain locations 
within the city, and that the plan was put before the city council. The city council then passed an 
ordinance adopting the plan, installing the signs at the locations designated by the engineer, but not 
at other locations, including the one where the accident took place. The court held the passage o f 
the ordinance, a legislative act, was in itself policy-oriented decision making, and that the city was 
therefore entitled to immunity for failing to put up a warning sign at that location. Mullen. 531 
N.E.2d at 230-31.
In summary, the Peavler factors constitute a test by which the courts may evaluate the quality of 
evidence offered by the governmental entity to determine whether in fact discretion was exercised at 
a policy-making level, thereby warranting discretionary function immunity. Reference to studies, 
surveys, board minutes, etc. serve to show that, while no legislative action was taken, policy-oriented 
decision making was.
Where legislative action is undertaken, however, the Peavler factors are not applicable: the legislative 
decision serves as evidence o f policy-oriented decision making in and o f itself. This is the argument 
which defense counsel can and should promote, where available.
Other post-Peavler decisions do not address the precise issue o f whether legislative functions equate 
with discretionary functions, but do illustrate how the courts have grappled with the Peavler factors. 
The decisions go both ways.
A  very recent decision, City of Crown Point v. Rutherford. 640 N.E.2d 750 (Ind.App. 1994) involved 
a pedestrian injured in a slip and fall on a city sidewalk. The city offered evidence that it financed the 
rehabilitation o f its sidewalks from two funds, a HUD program, and a 50-50 program designed to 
operate as a gap-filler to the HUD program. Under the 50-50 program, the Board o f Public Works 
targets a particular area for sidewalk rehabilitation and the board and residents split the cost o f 
sidewalk repairs. The trial court denied the city's motion for judgment on the evidence, concluding 
there was no evidence the city ever considered whether to repair the specific segment o f sidewalk at 
issue, and therefore never engaged in the type of policy-oriented decision making required under 
Peavler. There was also no evidence of planning or budgetary considerations concerning the location 
in question.
The Court o f Appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, finding the trial court's characterization 
o f the issue and its application o fPeavler to be overly narrow. The real issue, according to the Court 
o f Appeals, is whether Crown Point's management o f its sidewalk rehabilitation program resulted 
from decisions involving the formulation o f basic policy and from a balancing o f risks and benefits. 
Applying the planning/operational test, the court concluded Crown Point's actions were o f  the general 
type to be shielded by immunity, as the city had instituted a comprehensive scheme to renovate its 
sidewalks. There was testimony regarding the decision to target school zones, children's play areas 
and other high traffic zones such as the town square, all o f which was a sufficient showing by the city
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of discretionary decisions, even though the specific sidewalk area in question was not addressed at 
a policy-making level.
City of Crown Point represents a broader application o f the Peavler factors than perhaps even the 
Supreme Court contemplated, but is consistent with another recent decision which applied 
discretionary function immunity in a fashion more customary to practitioners, Voit v. Allen County. 
634 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.App. 1994).
In Voit, the plaintiff swerved and drove off a road in order to avoid another vehicle that was 
approaching left o f center. She then lost control, sailed over a culvert and collided with the earth 
embankment on the opposite side of the ditch. The plaintiff sued on the theory that the county was 
negligent in failing to make needed improvements to the road. According to her expert, these 
included extending the culvert pipe from 5 to 10 feet, widening the traffic lanes, widening the 
shoulder, and installing guardrails. The court noted that allegations o f  a failure to update, improve 
or modernize a roadway directly implicate discretionary function immunity under subsection 6. The 
county made a showing that it engaged in a systematic process for determining what improvements 
were to be made to highways in the county, which occurred through the Director o f Transportation 
Planning making recommendations for improvements to the Urban Transportation Advisory Board, 
which then made the ultimate decision on whether to accept or reject proposed improvements. The 
board would consider written recommendations, allocation o f available resources, and then prioritized 
the recommended projects. Here, the board concluded that traffic projections did not show a need 
to widen or improve the road in question. This showing was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
county, through its Urban Transportation Advisory Board, consciously engaged in decision making 
regarding the types o f improvements alleged in plaintiffs complaint, thus entitling the county to 
discretionary function immunity.
It should be noted that the systematic process for determining road improvements in Allen County, 
as well as the existence of the Advisory Board and Director o f Transportation Planning, are typically 
absent from less populous counties, making the likelihood of a required showing under Peavler all 
the more difficult.
An analogous result is seen in Cromer v. City o f Indianapolis. 540 N.E.2d 663 (Ind.App. 1989), 
where the plaintiff alleged the city was negligent for failing to cure a hazardous condition at an 
intersection o f a county road and state highway by causing the county road to end in a cul-de-sac. 
The city, through its Department of Transportation, had received a recommendation that the county 
road be closed north o f the state highway, but then considered the costs of closing the road, the 
availability o f alternate routes, the absence of financial participation from the railroad and the 
apparent lack o f cooperation from a neighboring county. The city elected not to implement the 
recommendation, and the court found the decision making process employed by the city was an 
executive function characterized by official judgment in weighing alternatives, competing priorities 
and budgetary considerations, and thus constituted a planning activity entitling the city to 
discretionary function immunity as to that claim. The court concluded the city was not entitled to 
discretionary function immunity, however, as to plaintiffs claim concerning the city's failure to install 
warning signs, as the city made no showing that it consciously balanced risks and benefits to arrive
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at a decision not to place warning signs along the county road.
Other noteworthy decisions include Gerbers Ltd, v. Wells County Drainage Board. 608 N.E.2d 997 
(Ind.App. 1993), where a 100 year storm caused extensive flooding to the property of private 
landowners, after the board had approved a request to fill a drainage ditch, which step, according to 
plaintiffs, caused the flooding to take place. The minutes o f the Drainage Board reflected little 
conscious deliberation, but affidavits from former members recited a history o f the board's 
encouraging commercial development along a roadway adjacent to the ditch, which affidavits 
supported the trial court's determination that the Drainage Board did in fact engage in conscious 
deliberation by weighing competing interests when allowing the drainage ditch to be filled, i.e., that 
a policy of economic growth outweighed any potential reduction in drainage capacity by filling the 
drain.
Also o f note is Greathouse v. Armstrong. 616 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. 1993), where a motorcyclist was 
killed after colliding with a bull on a roadway, during early morning hours. A sheriffs department 
dispatcher was on notice o f the fact that cattle were loose, and attempted to call the suspected owner 
o f the cattle over a two-hour period, but failed to locate the owner. The dispatcher also failed to 
dispatch an officer to the location where cattle were loose, prior to the collision. The court held that 
the decision by the dispatcher not to immediately send a deputy to investigate was merely operational 
and not subject to discretionaiy function immunity, nor was the decision by the department to adhere 
to a policy o f first attempting to call cattle owners to determine ownership before dispatching 
deputies. The court did find, however, that the sheriffs department owed no special duty to plaintiffs 
decedent, and thereby affirmed summary judgment for the sheriffs department.
F) Immunity for Failing to Adopt an Ordinance
Linked with discretionary function immunity, in road claims, is the immunity for an entity's "failure 
to adopt a law:"
A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of an employee's employment is not 
liable if a loss results from:
* *  *
7) the adoption and enforcement or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and 
regulations), unless the act o f enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.
Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(7).
Immunity under subsection 7 was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in 
Quakenbush v. Lackey. 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993), but only in the context o f immunity for law 
enforcement activities, as the immunity has always been construed as a bar to claims which rest on 
assertion that a governmental entity failed to undertake a legislative act.
For example, governmental entities are immune from liability in claims which allege that an unsafe 
or dangerous speed limit was established on a certain road. Speed limits are established by legislative 
act of the governing body o f the city, town or county. This is sufficient to provide statutory immunity
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under subsection 7. Cromer v. City o f Indianapolis. 540 N.E.2d 663 (Ind.App. 1989); Holiday 
Rambler Corporation v. Gessinger. 541 N.E.2d 559 (Ind.App. 1989).
In Quakenbush. the Supreme Court held that immunity under subsection 7 did not apply in favor of 
a police officer who was allegedly negligent in the operation of a patrol vehicle. The court preserved, 
however, "law enforcement immunity" in favor o f governmental entities with respect to attacks 
against the wisdom o f their laws, rules or regulations, with respect to whether an ordinance should 
or should not govern, or with respect to claims predicated upon the failure to act legislatively:
In part, this is so because the scope of the phrase "adoption or enforcement o f a law" used in Section 
3(7) is not limited to traditional law enforcement activities such as the arrest or pursuit o f suspects 
by police. Rather, in its broader (and correct) meaning. Section 3(71 applies to the decision o f any 
governmental entity and its employees about whether to adopt or enforce any statute, rule or 
regulation. Thus, under Section 3(7), a city is immune from any decision it makes concerning legal 
action to end a strike by firefighters, Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Association (1986), Ind.App., 
497 N.E.2d 1073, 1077; immunity attaches to an administrative order from the Department of Natural 
Resources that a property owner stop construction o f a dam, State v. Taylor (1981), Ind.App., 419 
N.E.2d 819, 822-23; immunity attaches to the Department o f Corrections and its employees for an 
investigation o f attorney's activities, Indiana Department o f Correction v. Stagg (1990), Ind.App., 
556 N.E.2d 1338,1341-42; immunity attaches to a municipality that issued a stop work order in the 
course of enforcing a zoning ordinance, City of Seymour v. Onyx Paving Company (1989), Ind.App., 
541 N.E.2d 951, 958; and immunity attaches to a sanitation officer's enforcement of a local disposal 
ordinance, Board o f Commissioners of Hendricks County v. King (1985), Ind.App., 481 N.E.2d 
1327, 1331. All o f the above activities relate to enforcement of or failure to enforce laws, rules or 
regulations by a governmental entity.
Quackenbush. 622 N.E.2d at 1287 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the holding in Tell City rested not only on discretionary function immunity, but on immunity 
under subsection 7 as well. There has been no change injudicial application o f subsection 7 since Tell 
City was decided, and Tell City. Cromer and Holiday Rambler remain good law with regard to their 
consideration o f this immunity. The same can be said of City of Indianapolis v. Constant and DuBois 
County Bank v. City o f Vincennes, supra, both pre-Peavler decisions which rested on application of 
discretionary function immunity and/or immunity for adopting or failing to adopt a law. Both 
Constant and DuBois County Bank were pending on petition to transfer at the time Peavler was 
decided, yet the court denied transfer in each. Why? — because the issue in Constant revolved 
around the failure to install a regulatory device, as did the issue o f curb markings in DuBois County 
Bank.
Therefore, governmental entities are immune for failing to adopt laws, and installation o f regulatory 
signs, markings and other devices which require ordinance may indeed be the types o f activities which 
are subject to immunity for failing to adopt a law. Certain immunity provisions have been construed 
as a codification of common law, Walton v. Ramp, 407 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind.App. 1980), and subsection 
7 conforms to the existing body of common law, described previously, which held that governmental 
entities owe no common law duty to perform legislative functions. Defense counsel should therefore
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argue that subsection 7 applies to immunize governmental entities for their failure to adopt ordinances 
regulating traffic, i.e., for their failure to install stop signs, lower speed limits, etc. An ordinance 
stands on the same general footing as an act o f the legislature. Pittsburg C.C. & S.L. Rv. Company 
v. Hartford City. 85 N.E. 362, 170 Ind. 674 (1908).
A good example is a hypothetical claim in which two vehicles collide at a blind hillcrest, at night, 
where the non-passing party joins the county on allegation that the county failed to establish a no 
passing zone; that had a no passing zone been established, the defendant-driver would not have 
passed at the blind hill, which hill he claims he could not see at night.
Ind. Code 9-21-4-13 governs installation o f no passing zones, and provides:
A local unit that has responsibility for roads and streets may determine by an engineering and traffic 
investigation those parts o f a road or street, including bridges, under the unit's jurisdiction where 
overtaking and passing or driving to the left o f the roadway would be especially hazardous. Upon 
making that determination, the local unit may, by ordinance, designate no-passing zones by 
appropriate signs or marks on the roadway.
The statute therefore requires an ordinance before the entity may establish a no-passing zone by signs 
or markings on the pavement. Thus, the entity's failure to enact an ordinance establishing the no­
passing zone falls squarely within the immunity for failing to adopt a law. Again, if a statutory 
immunity applies, the governmental entity is simply not subject to liability. State v. Taylor. 419 
N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ind.App. 1981).
G) Summary
The Supreme Court has, since Peavler. consistently displayed a propensity toward narrow 
construction o f the immunity provisions o f the Tort Claims Act, the most recent pronouncement 
being the virtual abolition o f "law enforcement immunity" in police-related claims. Quackenbush v. 
Lackey, supra; Kemezv v. Peters 622 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. 1993); Belding v. Town o f New Whiteland. 
622 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. 1993); Fries v. Fincher. 622 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1993). Still, more than mere 
vestiges o f governmental immunity remain, and the lower courts are not refusing to recognize 
application o f statutory immunity where it is due.
Immunity for crashes involving police vehicles had no correlative at common law, but there are a 
number o f common law rules and understandings which are codified in the Tort Claims Act, for 
example, the notion that there is no duty in tort for injuries arising from natural accumulations o f ice 
or snow on streets or sidewalks. City o f South Bend v. Fink. 139 Ind.App. 282, 219 N.E.2d 441 
(1966); LaPorte Civic Auditorium v. Ames. 641 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind.App. 1994). This common law 
rule is codified now in subsection 3 o f the immunities section of the Tort Claims Act, which confers 
immunity for temporary conditions o f public thoroughfares which result from weather.
Discretionary function immunity, likewise, is really just a statutory choice o f words for the old 
governmental immunity: immunity for governmental functions as opposed to "private" functions. 
Its historical and jurisprudential antecedents are long-standing, as is immunity for failing to adopt a
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law.
Attempting to fulfill the Peavler factors in road litigation often is an exercise in futility, especially in 
claims involving rural counties or small towns, which tend to operate on a haphazard level, without 
professional staff, boards or risk managers, and with few resources for activities such as studies, or 
recommendations. Most governmental entities, at least outside o f the larger urban centers, do little 
more than attempt to maintain deteriorating roadway surfaces and re-erect downed signs. Many have 
no engineer.
The task of defense counsel therefore becomes one of finding immunity where it is available. Peavler. 
viewed properly, deters effective arguments in favor o f discretionary function immunity in many 
claims, but not all. Comprehensive road sign ordinances may exist to provide a bona fide basis for 
immunity, as do legal arguments predicated upon the failure to undertake actions which, by statute, 
require legislation. The following checklist provides tips for investigating road claims from both the 
perspective o f plaintiff and defendant, and may also be useful for drafting written discovery.
H) Checklist
Failing to secure immunity does not equate with liability, but the availability o f immunity arguments 
must be explored and dealt with on motion for summary judgment. Remember immunity is an 
affirmative defense and must be pled as such, and the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden 
o f proof on the issue. However, immunity is a question of law for the court to decide — it is never 
a jury issue, and immunity cannot be defeated on mere assertion that there exists material issues o f 
fact. Where the facts are controverted, it is the role o f the court, not a jury, to make findings o f fact, 
Peavler. 528 N.E.2d at 46 n .l, and then determine whether, based on the facts, the governmental 
entity has carried its burden in establishing entitlement to immunity.
I) What is the nature o f the act or omission complained of? Generalized assertions that a road 
or intersection is "dangerous" are insufficient, as the claim must be reduced to specific 
failings: absence o f signage, absence o f markings, improper location o f signs, etc.
2) Is the claim actually one based on failure to undertake a major public improvement, e.g., that 
the road has no shoulder, or has too sharp a curve? If so, not only discretionary function 
immunity but design immunity under Section 34-4-16.5-3(16) may apply. See Voit v. Allen 
County. 634 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.App. 1994).
3) For the plaintiff, it is best to attempt to characterize the claim as one in maintenance, if 
possible, and therefore one involving the failure to undertake operational activities, exempt 
from discretionary function immunity.
4) Locate applicable ordinances, board minutes, or other writings which show consideration by 
the entity's legislative branch of various problems with its roads. For example, a plan to 
improve roads on a systematic basis, year in and year out, or a program whereby various 
roads receive treatment or improvement as monies become available, may be sufficient to 
satisfy discretionary function immunity as to certain claims.
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5) Determine whether the entity assessed priorities, weighed budgetary considerations, or 
allocated resources, be it by passage o f ordinance or otherwise, in determining whether to 
sign its roads.
6) If  the entity has an engineer, find out if he has developed a systematic plan for addressing the 
county's road needs, including its signing needs, as he is required to do by statute, Ind. Code 
8-17-5-6, and whether his plans or proposals were considered by the county board of 
commissioners, the city council or town board, and with what result.
7) Attempt to characterize the entity's conduct as a policy decision, if possible, by evidence 
showing the entity elected not to pursue improvements due to cost, manpower considerations, 
etc.
8) I f  decisions were made by vote o f the legislative body o f the entity, a split vote is all the more 
evidence that the body dealt with a bona fide political issue, as opposed to a mere operational 
issue.
9) Determine whether the omission complained o f involved a regulatory objective, under Ind. 
Code 9-21.
10) Determine if the legislative body delegated policy-making decision making to other officials, 
such as a county superintendent o f highways.
11) For the plaintiff, it is best to focus the claim on a failure to undertake the least expensive 
measure, e.g., putting up a sign as opposed to rebuilding a roadway, as the courts are prone 
to  recognize immunity where the claim rests on the failure to undertake large public 
improvements.
12) Secure the accident history of the location in question by securing copies o f prior reported 
accidents from the county sheriff or from the Indiana State Police, Central Records Division. 
Evidence o f prior accidents at the location may be admissible at trial to show notice if the 
prior accidents arose at the same location, under similar conditions, from the same cause. 
State v. Fair. 423 N.E.2d 738 (Ind.App. 1981). But see State v. Willian, 423 N.E.2d 668 
(Ind.App. 1981).
13) I f  the claim involves a downed sign, discover the evidence concerning actual or constructive 
notice. Governmental entities are not liable for road defects absent actual or constructive 
notice. Three hours actual notice has been held sufficient to permit a jury issue, Howard v. 
Trevino. 613 N.E.2d 847 (Ind.App. 1993), but absent actual notice, plaintiff still has to offer 
some evidence showing the sign to have been down for at least some time, in order to avoid 
summary judgment. Bodnar v. City o f Gary, 629 N.E.2d 278 (Ind.App. 1994).
14) I f  the claim involves a pothole, road dropoff or other pavement defect, determine if the entity 
was on notice of the defect and if it had in place a plan for systematically dealing with it as 
time and resources became available.
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15) Determine the extent o f the entity's road system, in miles. The magnitude o f the burden in 
maintaining many miles o f roadway can serve as a basis for arguing non-liability, where the 
entity effectively shows its methods o f remedying defects were reasonable, in light o f the 
number o f  miles of roadway under its jurisdiction. See Miller v. Indiana State Highway 
Department. 507N.E.2d 1009 (Ind.App. 1987).
16) Encourage entity clients to adopt comprehensive road sign ordinances for their regulatory 
signs and devices, by establishing first an inventory o f existing signage and then codifying 
their lawful installation by ordinance.
17) Encourage entity clients to evaluate warning sign requirements, marking requirements, or any 
other potential measures, to formulate plans for undertaking such measures, and then securing 
legislative body approval of the plans, as a means o f securing discretionary function immunity.
18) Verify that the tort claim notice was served on the "governing body" per Section 34-4-16.5-7, 
meaning the board of commissioners, the county attorney, the mayor, the city council, the 
town board. Service o f a tort claim notice on a sheriff, for example, is insufficient to show 
service on the board of commissioners, and will bar the claim as against the county. Hupp 
v. Hill. 576 N.E.2d 1320 (Ind.App. 1991).
